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Note
Who's the Boss?: Charge Nurses and
"Independent Judgment" After National Labor
Relations Board v. Health Care & Retirement
Corporation of America
R. Jason Straight*
In 1994, the United Industry Workers petitioned the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) for an election to allow
forty-five licensed practical nurses (LPNs) to vote on whether
or not they wished to unionize.' Their employer, operator of
the Ten Broeck Commons nursing home, objected to the
petition, claiming that the LPNs were "supervisors" as defined
by section 2(11) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)2
and thus were ineligible to unionize under the statute.
The NLRA is intended to protect the rights of any employ-
ee who wishes to unionize, but does not include any individual
employed as a supervisor. 3 Section 2(11) defines a supervisor as:
any individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to
hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign,
reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them,
or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action,
if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is
not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of
independent judgment.4
The NLRB has interpreted section 2(11) to require a three-step
analysis to determine whether a particular worker is a super-
visor under the Act. First, the worker must perform one or
more of the twelve supervisory activities listed.5 Second, the
* J.D. Candidate 2000, University of Minnesota Law School; B. 1992,
Macalester College.
L See Nymed, Inc. (Ten Broeck Commons), 320 N.L.R.B. 806, 806
(1996).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1994).
3. Id- § 152(3).
4. Id § 152(11).
5. See id
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activity must be performed in the interest of the employer.6
The third step ensures that employees who perform minor
supervisory functions in a routine manner are not unfairly
exempted for the Act by requiring that supervisory authority
be exercised using independent judgment.7
The LPNs at Ten Broeck Commons, who earned approx-
imately $11 per hour, took turns functioning as charge nurses
during the evening, late-night and weekend shifts.8 During a
rotation as charge nurse, an LPN's duties included "overseeing
the [nurses' aides], making rounds to be sure that the residents
are being properly cared for, consulting with [doctors], ordering
medications from the pharmacy as instructed by the doctor,
picking up orders, filling out charts, and updating patient in-
formation."9 Because each of the forty-five LPNs at Ten Broeck
commons served as a charge nurse at one time or another, the
employer argued that all of the LPNs were excluded from the
coverage of the NLRA.10
For two decades, the NLRB routinely found that LPN
charge nurses, such as those at Ten Broeck Commons,11 were
not statutory supervisors under the NLRA.12 The Board con-
ceded that charge nurses performed supervisory functions
under section 2(11), but reasoned that the charge nurses did
not perform these functions "in the interest of the employer,"
as required by the second prong of the test, but instead acted in
the interest of "patient care."13
In 1994 the Supreme Court rejected the Board's "patient
care" analysis in National Labor Relations Board v. Health
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See Nymed, Inc. (Ten Broeck Commons), 320 N.L.R.B. 806, 807-08
(1996).
9. Id. at 807.
10. See id. at 806.
11. Many hospitals identify some of their Registered Nurses (RNs) as
charge nurses as well. This Note, however, focuses on LPN charge nurses
employed at nursing homes. For a detailed comparison of charge nurses in
hospitals with those in nursing homes, see generally Jonathan Edward
Motley, Grandmothers and Teamsters: How the NLRB's New Approach to the
Supervisory Status of Charge Nurses Ignores the Reality of the Nursing Home,
73 IND. L.J. 711 (1998).
12. See Beverly Enters., 313 N.L.R.B. 491, 493 (1993) (noting that the
NLRB has "utilized the 'patient care' analysis as an aid to determining
supervisory status of charge nurses" since 1974).
13. Id. at 493-94.
1928 [Vol. 83:1927
WHO'S THE BOSS?
Care & Retirement Corporation of America,14 holding that all
tasks performed by employees in the line of duty are, by def-
inition, performed in the interest of the employer.' 5
After the Health Care decision forced the Board to
abandon its "patient care" analysis, the Board shifted the focus
of its analysis to section 2(11)'s requirement that "independent
judgment" be exhibited in the performance of a supervisory
task.16 In the Ten Broeck Commons case, which was one of the
first charge nurse cases heard by the Board after Health Care,
the Board held that the charge nurse LPNs did not demon-
strate the requisite independent judgment in performing their
supervisory tasks.' 7 Instead, the Board determined that their
authority was "narrowly circumscribed to giving rather general
routine directions to lesser skilled employees."' 8 Consequently,
the Board ruled that the LPNs were free to unionize under the
protection of the NLRA.19 Although the Board's "independent
judgment" analysis is textually consistent with the Health
Care decision, the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals are
currently split on the issue of whether the Board's analysis is
nevertheless inconsistent with the spirit and intent of Health
Care.20
This Note argues that the Board's "independent judgment"
analysis is consistent both with the text and purpose of the
NLRA and controlling precedent. Part I briefly outlines the
history of the NLRA and discusses the origins of the
supervisors' exemption. Part H analyzes the interpretations
the Board and the courts have applied to the Act, and the
nature of the current dispute among the circuit courts and the
Board. Part I argues that the Supreme Court misinterpret-
ed, or at the very least misrepresented, its own precedent in
Health Care. This Part also contends that the circuit courts
have further confused the issue by adopting a broader reading
of Health Care than is warranted by the holding. Part IV
concludes that the Supreme Court can and should clarify the
14. 511 U.S. 571 (1994).
15. See id. at 576-78.
16. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1994).
17. See Nymed, Inc. (Ten Broeck Commons), 320 N.L.R.B. 806, 810(1996).
18. Id. at 811-12.
19. See id at 814.
20. See infra Part II.C.
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issue by validating the Board's independent judgment test and
admonishing the lower courts to defer to the Board's analysis.
I. HISTORY OF THE NLRA
A. ORIGINS OF THE SUPERVISOR EXEMPTON
The NLRA, as originally enacted, protected employees'
rights to organize collectively and form unions for the purpose
of engaging in collective bargaining with their employers.21
The Act was intended to increase the bargaining power of
workers negotiating terms and conditions of employment with
employers.22 The opening section of the NLRA contains the
following statement of purpose:
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not
possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and
employers who are organized in the corporate or other forms of
ownership association substantially burdens and affects the flow of
commerce ....
The Act created the NLRB and charged it with, inter alia,
certifying bargaining units and supervising union represen-
tation elections.24 When a union files a petition for an election
with the Board, the Board is required to examine the job
classifications and respective duties of the workers seeking
representation to determine whether each bargaining unit
conforms to the NLRA.25 One of the determinations the Board
must make during this stage is whether or not there are any
supervisors contained in the prospective bargaining units. 26
The only two categories of individuals defined in the 1935
Act were "employer" and "employee."2 7 A worker was entitled
to protection under the Act if he was not an "employer," at term
defined in section 2(2) as "any person acting in the interest of
2L See National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 7,49 Stat. 449,452 (1935)
(current version at 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994)).
22 See id. § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 151).
23. 29 U.S.C. § 151.
24. See id. § 159.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See id. § 2(3), 49 Stat. 449, 450 (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 152(3)).
The definition of "employee" contained in the NLRA as adopted in 1935
included "any employee." The only workers explicitly excluded under the
original definition were agricultural laborers, workers in the "domestic service
of any family or person at his home or any individual employed by his parent
or spouse." Id-
1930 [Vol. 83:1927
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an employer directly or indirectly."28 The question of whether
supervisors were employers was not addressed until seven
years after the passage of the NLRA.29 When the Board finally
began to receive requests to certify bargaining units made up-
of supervisors beginning in 1942, it was unable to formulate a
consistent stance on the issue of certification.30 After ffip-
flopping its position twice, the Board eventually approved the
creation of supervisors' unions.31
The Supreme Court affirmed the NLRB's recognition of
supervisors' right to organize in 1947, in Packard Motor Car
Co. v. National Labor Relations Board.32 In Packard, the
Supreme Court pointed out that the definition of employer was
circular because "[elvery employee, from the very fact of
employment in the employer's business, is required to act in
[the employer's] interest."33 As a result, Packard held that
"W[the context of the Act... leaves no room for a construction of
this section to deny the organizational privilege to employees
because they act in the interest of an employer."34 The Court's
remarkably broad interpretation of the phrase "in the
employer's interest" rendered section 2(2) meaningless as a
criterion for certifying bargaining units and opened the door
for unionizing efforts by virtually any classification of worker-
including management.35
28. See id. § 2(2), 49 Stat. 449, 450 (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 152(2)).
29. See Union Collieries Coal Co., 41 N.L.R.B. 874 (1942).
30. See H.R. REP. No. 80-245, at 13 (1947).
31. For a description of the Board's early decisions addressing the
certification of supervisors' unions, see H.R. REP. No. 80-245 (1947).
Congress, in 1942, responding to the Board's initial acceptance of bargaining
units composed of foremen, considered a bill creating an exemption for
foremen under the NLRA. This bill was abandoned, however, when the Board
appeared to reverse its policy in 1943 by refusing to certify a group of
supervisors. See Maryland Drydock Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 733 (1943). It was not
until 1945 and the Supreme Court's decision in Packard Motor Car Co. v.
NLRB, 330 U.S. 485 (1947), that the alarm was again sounded by industrial
employers, prompting Congress to again take up the cause.
32. 330 U.S. at 491-93.
33. Id. at 488.
34. Id.
35. Justice Douglas's dissent in Packard reflects the overblown fear
expressed by employers over the implications of the Packard decision. See id.
at 493-501 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Stating that the majority opinion "tends
to obliterate the line between management and labor," Douglas suggests that
"if foremen are 'employees' [under the NLRAI, so are vice-presidents,
managers, assistant managers, superintendents, assistant superintendents-
indeed, all who are on the payroll of the company, including the president."
19311999]
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The concern with allowing supervisors to unionize is based
on the fear that supervisors' unions, even those that claim to be
independent, may be effectively controlled by rank and file
unions. Any alliance between a supervisors' organization and
a rank and file union would seriously compromise the ability of
the employer to rely on these supervisors as their loyal agents
in the workplace. The supervisors' allegiance would be split
between the employer whom they ostensibly represent and the
employees with whom they would be joined in solidarity
fighting for better working conditions.36
Congress recognized that management unions contradicted
the purpose of equalizing bargaining power between rank and
file workers and the employer. 37 Consequently, Congress
enacted the Taft-Hartley Amendments and unequivocally over-
rode Packard by creating an explicit exclusion for supervisors
and modifying the definition of employer.38 Under the new
Id. at 494.
36. See David M. Rabban, Distinguishing Excluded Managers from
Covered Professionals Under the NLRA, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1775, 1785 (1990);
cf. Frederick J. Woodson, Note, NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of
America: Signaling the Need for Revision of the NLRA, 14 J.L. & COM. 301,
312 (1995) (acknowledging that conflicts of interests are an issue in any
employment relationship but pointing to the trend toward participative
management as evidence that such conflicts are not as serious as had been
previously suggested).
37. The committee report accompanying the Taft-Hartley provision that
finally succeeded in exempting supervisors stated:
The evidence before the committee shows clearly that unionizing
supervisors under the Labor Act is inconsistent with the purpose of
the act to increase output of goods that move in the stream of
commerce and thus to increase its flow. It is inconsistent with the
policy of Congress to assure to workers freedom from domination or
control by their supervisors in their organizing and bargaining
activities. It is inconsistent with our policy to protect the rights of
employers; they, as well as workers, are entitled to loyal
representatives in the plants, but when the foremen unionize, even in
a union that claims to be "independent" of the union of the rank and
file, they are subject to influence and control by the rank and file
union, and, instead of their bossing the rank and file, the rank and
file bosses them.
H.R. REP. No. 80-245, at 14 (1947).
38. See National Labor Relations Act, ch. 120, tit. I, § 10, 61 Stat. 136,
137 (1947) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 149-187 (1994)). Congress actually
attempted to nullify the Packard decision directly with the Case Bill-a bill
that was considered before Congress voted on the larger Labor Management
Relations Act. Both houses of Congress easily passed the Case bill, which
specifically exempted supervisors from coverage under the NLRA. See H.R.
REP. No. 80-245, at 14 (1947). Despite this clear showing that the Packard
decision was contrary to congressional intent, President Truman vetoed the
1932 [Vol. 83:1927
WHO'S THE BOSS?
definition of "supervisor" contained in section 2(11) of the Act,
workers who possessed the independent authority to hire,
transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, promote, discharge, assign,
reward, discipline, direct or adjust the grievances of other
employees in the interest of the employer were deemed
supervisors 39
It is clear both from the legislative history of the Taft-
Hartley amendments and the nature of the workforce in 1947
that the supervisor exemption was primarily aimed at exclud-
ing industrial shop foremen and other low-level managers in
the manufacturing sector.40 Congress appeared to have a
certain type of employee in mind when it described the
employees who fall under the definition of "supervisors":
Supervisors are management people. They have distinguished
themselves in their work. They have demonstrated their ability to
take care of themselves without depending upon the pressure of
collective action. No one forced them to become supervisors. They
abandoned the "collective security" of the rank and file voluntarily,
because they believed the opportunities thus opened to them to be
more valuable to them than such "security." It seems wrong, and it is
wrong, to subject people of this kind, who have demonstrated their
initiative, their ambition and their ability to get ahead, to the
levelling processes of seniority, uniformity and standardization that
the Supreme Court recognizes as being fundamental principles of
unionism.4'
By excluding supervisors, Congress intended to correct a
"development which probably more than any other single factor
has upset any real balance of power in the collective-
bargaining process."42 In enacting the exclusion, however,
Congress was careful to note that certain employees with
"minor supervisory duties" face employment issues which
override their supervisory role and justify coverage by the
Act.43 The Senate Report issued with the 1947 amendments
bill. See id.
39. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1994).
40. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 80-245, at 13-17; S. REP. NO. 80-105, at 3-5
(1947) (discussing the problems of unionizing foremen in industry); cf. NLRB
v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 694 (1980) (remarking that the purpose of the
exclusion is to prevent management representatives from influencing rank
and file's selection of bargaining representatives and union leaders); Schnuck
Mkts., Inc. v. NLRB, 961 F.2d 700, 703 n.7 (8th Cir. 1992) (proposing that the
purpose of excluding supervisors from the Act is to enable employers to use
them to continue production during strikes by the rank and file).
41. H.R. REP. NO. 80-245, at 16-17.
42. S. REP. NO. 80-105, at 3.
43. Id. at 4.
19331999]
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recognized that the Act distinguished between minor
supervisory employees and supervisors with "genuine manage-
ment prerogatives as the right to hire or fire, discipline, or
make effective recommendations with respect to such action."44
The legislative history makes clear that since the very birth of
the supervisor exclusion, Congress was cognizant of its
inability to make a bright line distinction between true
supervisors and employees. 45 Distinguishing genuine super-
visors from those who are merely employees who perform
limited supervisory functions was a task left to the NLRB.46
B. THE STATUS OF PROFESSIONALS AFTER TAFT-HARTLEY
The Taft-Hartley amendments created a new protected
class under the Act called "professional employees."47 These
professionals generally had completed advanced training or
education programs and engaged in primarily intellectual work
requiring the exercise of considerable discretion and
judgment.48 The purpose of this provision was to provide
employees who fit the definition of "professional" with the
option of maintaining a bargaining unit separate from less
skilled employees. 49 Nurses were one of the groups that
Congress specifically sought to protect with this provision.5 0
44- Id. (emphasis added).
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. The definition of "professional employee" now contained in the Act is:
(a) any employee engaged in work (i) predominantly
intellectual and varied in character as opposed to routine mental,
manual, mechanical, or physical work; (ii) involving the consistent
exercise of discretion and judgment in its performance; (iii) of such a
character that the output produced or the result accomplished cannot
be standardized in relation to a given period of time; (iv) requiring
knowledge of an advanced type in a field of science or learning
customarily acquired by a prolonged course of specialized intellectual
instruction and study in an institution of higher learning or a
hospital, as distinguished from a general academic education or from
an apprenticeship or from training in the performance of routine
mental, manual, or physical processes; or
(b) any employee, who i) has completed the courses of
specialized intellectual instruction and study described in clause (iv)
of paragraph (a), and (ii) is performing related work under the
supervision of a professional person to qualify himself to become a
professional employee as defined in paragraph (a).
29 U.S.C. § 152(12) (1994).
48. See id
49. See id. § 159(b); see also S. REP. No. 80-105, at 11 (1947). The Act
states that no bargaining unit may be certified by the Board "if such unit
1934 [Vol. 83:1927
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1. Supervisors vs. Professionals
There is considerable overlap between the types of workers
who satisfy the definition of "professional employee" contained
in section 2(12) and those that fit the description of
"supervisor" under section 2(11). Indeed, the same attributes
that distinguish a professional employee from a rank and file
employee, such as increased autonomy, discretion and
responsibility, greater skill and training, and higher salaries,
also tend to make these workers resemble supervisors.5 1
Perhaps the most delicate and significant distinction made
in separating supervisors from mere professional employees is
distinguishing true supervisory work involving supervisory
tasks and requiring the exercise of "independent judgment"52
from a professional's "predominantly intellectual" work
requiring "the consistent exercise of discretion and judgment in
its performance." 53
includes both professional employees and employees who are not professional
employees unless a majority of such professional employees vote for inclusion
in such unit." 29 U.S.C. § 159(b). Expressing the concern that Congress was
addressing with the "professional employee" provision, the Senate Report
states, referring to professionals, that "[slince their number is always small in
comparison with production or clerical employees, collective agreements
seldom reflect their desires." S. REP. No. 80-105, at 11.
50. See S. REP. NO. 80-105, at 11. The Senate Report states: "Although
there has been a trend in recent years for manufacturing corporations to
employ many professional persons, including.., nurses, no corresponding
recognition was given by Congress to their special problems. Nevertheless
such employees have a great community of interest in maintaining certain
professional standards." Id. Congress did not likely contemplate protecting
nurses who worked in hospitals or nursing homes in 1947 because such
facilities were not yet covered by the NLRA. See infra note 51 and
accompanying text. Congress likely did not foresee the plight of LPNs in the
nursing homes of the 1990s because the Act did not apply to hospitals or
nursing homes until it was amended to include for-profit health care facilities
in 1967 and all health care facilities in 1974. See Motley, supra note 11, at
722.
51. See Rabban, supra note 36, at 1778. Rabban describes the problems
inherent in applying the NLRA, designed for industrial workers of the 1930s,
to professional employees who "have more autonomy from hierarchical control
and more involvement in organizational decisionmaking than the workers for
whom the statute was initially intended." Id.
52. 29 U.S.C. § 152(11).
53. Id- § 152(12); see also Beverly Enters., 313 N.L.R.B. 491, 493 (1993)
("Deciding whether an individual possesses any 2(11) indicia of supervisory
authority often calls for making delicate, difficult, and even fine distinctions,
and there are frequently gray areas.").
19351999]
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2. The Supreme Court and Supervisors: Yeshiva
The Supreme Court struggled with this issue in NLRB v.
Yeshiva University.5 4 The Court conceded that "[t]here may be
some tension between the [NLRA's] exclusion of managerial
employees and its inclusion of professionals since most
professionals in managerial positions continue to draw on their
special skills and training. 55 In an attempt to clarify this
distinction, the Supreme Court has said that "[o]nly if an
employee's activities fall outside the scope of the duties
routinely performed by similarly situated professionals will he
be found aligned with management" and thus a supervisor
according to the Act.5 6 The tasks many professionals perform
may bear a resemblance to the exercise of management auth-
ority when these tasks are actually an ordinary professional
duty of the job and reflect no true management power.5 7 The
Court nevertheless rejected the Board's contention that
university faculty members were simply exhibiting their pro-
fessional judgment in determining curricula, establishing
grading and admissions policies, and setting tuition rates,
stating bluntly that "it is difficult to imagine decisions more
managerial than these."58
II. CHARGE NURSES AND THE NLRA
Charge nurses are a prime example of workers in the
murky region where the professional and supervisor defin-
itions overlap.59 The typical hierarchical structure of a private
nursing home consists of an Administrator overseeing the
entire operation at the top, a registered nurse (RN) acting as
the Director of Nursing (DON) who reports to the
Administrator, and an Assistant Director of Nursing (ADON)
who may be a Licensed Practical Nurse (LPN).60 Patient care
responsibilities are carried out by LPNs and nurses' aides who
make up the front line of the nursing home staff. Generally,
54. 444 U.S. 672 (1980).
55. Id. at 686.
56. Id. at 690. The Court stated that this analysis "accurately capture[s]
the intent of Congress." Id.
57. See id. at 683-84.
58. Id. at 686.
59. See Motley, supra note 11, at 712-13 (discussing the NLRB's
inconsistent interpretations of the Act in cases involving the "difficult issue as
to whether nurses are professional employees or supervisors").
60. See Caremore, Inc. v. NLRB, 129 F.3d 365, 367 (6th Cir. 1997).
1936 [Vol. 83:1927
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the DON and ADON are present during daytime shifts, but not
at night. Although the DON and ADON are typically "on call"
during the night shifts, the charge nurse LPNs are the most
skilled and experienced employees physically present inside
the nursing home at night.
Looking at their specialized training and the general
nature of their work, charge nurse LPNs appear to be
professionals. Once on the job, charge nurses are typically
engaged in work requiring the exercise of discretion and
judgment in attending to the various needs of nursing home
patients. On the other hand, a closer examination reveals
duties and responsibilities that could place charge nurses
within the Act's definition of "supervisor." Typical supervisory
duties of charge nurses include assigning aides to particular
patients, calling in additional aides if there is a staff shortage,
asking aides to work overtime and providing advice to the
aides as necessary to provide patient care.6 1 Many charge
nurses, because they work closely with the aides, are also
involved to some degree in evaluating the aides' performance. 62
In light of this, it is unclear whether a charge nurse is
exercising "independent judgment" in carrying out these tasks,
or merely exhibiting the "discretion and judgment" necessarily
displayed by any professional employee.
The NLRB and, in turn, the courts, repeatedly have
attempted to resolve this question. The Supreme Court in
Yeshiva confirmed that a worker may be both a professional
and a supervisor.63 In that case the University pointed to the
supervisory exclusion and refused to bargain with a union
composed of faculty members. The University did not dispute
that the faculty were professionals under the Act, but insisted
that the faculty could still be excluded from the Act because
they were also "'supervisors' who use independent judgment in
overseeing other employees in the interest of the employer or
under the judicially implied exclusion for 'managerial
employees' who are involved in developing and enforcing
employer policy." The Court rejected the Board's finding that
the faculty members were merely exercising the "independent
professional judgment" inexorably tied to their professional
6L See, e.g., id. at 367.
62. See, e.g., id.
63. See NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 681-82 (1980).
64 Id.
1999] 1937
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duties.6 5 The majority opinion made clear that the Court was
"not suggesting an application of the managerial exclusion that
would sweep all professionals outside the Act in derogation of
Congress' expressed intent to protect them."66
A. THE 1974 AMENDMENTS
When it amended the NLRA to cover all health care
facilities in 1974, Congress intended that the Board take the
lead to protect health care professionals from being unfairly
excluded by the supervisor exception. It may be reasonably
inferred from Congress's decision not to amend section 2(11) to
exclude professionals that it acquiesced in the Board's method
of handling supervisor cases in the health care setting.6 7 The
Senate committee report that accompanied the 1974 amend-
ment supports this conclusion:
Various organizations representing health care professionals have
urged an amendment to Section 2(11) of the Act so as to exclude such
professionals from the definition of "supervisor." The Committee has
studied this definition with particular reference to health care
professionals, such as registered nurses, interns, residents, fellows,
and salaried physicians and concludes that the proposed amendment
is unnecessary because of existing Board decisions. The Committee
notes that the Board has carefully avoided applying the definition of
"supervisor" to a health care professional who gives direction to other
employees in the exercise of professional judgment, which direction is
incidental [to] the professional's treatment of patients, and thus is
not the exercise of supervisory authority in the interest of the
employer.
The Committee expects the Board to continue evaluating the facts
of each case in this manner when making its determinations.a
65. See id. at 683-84.
66. Id. at 690.
67. The so called "acquiescence rule" assumes that when Congress fails to
amend a statute, it acquiesces in the known authoritative agency
interpretation of a statute. See Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 259-60
(1991); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 596-602 (1983). But
see Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (rejecting the
acquiescence rule).
68. S. REP. No. 93-766, at 6 (1974) (emphasis added); see also Beverly
Enters., 313 N.L.R.B. 491, 492-93 (1993).
In enacting the amendments, Congress was concerned with the quality of
health care provided by health care facilities that were governed, until 1974,
by the states' labor laws. See Kathryn L. Hays, Note, NLRB v. Health Care &
Retirement Corporation of America A "Narrow" Decision?, 55 LA. L. REV. 987,
994 (1995). Congress believed that enabling health care workers, including
health care professionals, to freely unionize would help to remedy perceived
problems in the industry. See id. These problems included "low wages, poor
WHO'S THE BOSS?
B. THE "PATIENT CARE" ANALYSIS
For some twenty years after the 1974 amendments, the
Board obeyed Congress's clearly expressed mandate and
evaluated each case to determine whether a nurse was a
supervisor under the Act. The Board's three-step evaluation
emphasized the second step: section 2(11)'s "in the interest of
the employer" language. 69 Drawing the line between pro-
fessional and supervisor required the Board to determine
whether health care workers who directed other employees as
part of their duty to provide patient care were also acting as
supervisors in the interest of the employer.7 0 The Board
claimed that to the extent charge nurses' purported super-
visory responsibilities merely reflected their professional
commitment to patient care, it was in the patients' interest
rather than in the interest of the employer that these duties
were carried out.71 Therefore, argued the Board, as long as
charge nurses are exercising independent professional judg-
ment, charge nurses were not required to choose between the
employer's interests and the interests of other employees,
"because the two sets of interests will rarely diverge."72 The
Board believed that only when charge nurses possessed the
authority to effectively promote, demote, award raises or
discipline other employees should they be classified as exempt
supervisory employees.73
The Board's approach became known as the "patient care"
analysis.74 This analysis presumed that employers hired
nurses, both RNs and LPNs, for their professional skills in
working conditions, and a lower standard of patient care." Id.
69. See Beverly Enters., 313 N.L.R.B. at 493; Motley, supra note 11, at
722-23.
70. See Beverly Enters., 313 N.L.R.B. at 493.
71. See id.
72. Id.
73. See id. at 494. The Board stated that:
in the health care field, as in other industries, the authority on the
part of more skilled and experienced employees to assign and direct
other employees in the interest of providing high quality and efficient
service generally is not found to confer supervisory status, whereas
the authority to promote, demote, award raises, or discipline (or to
effectively recommend those actions) is invariably found to confer
supervisory status.
Id.
74. See G. Roger King, Where Have All the Supervisors Gone?-The
Board's Misdiagnosis of Health Care & Retirement Corp., 13 LAB. LAW. 343,
344-46 (1997).
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patient care and that the exercise of such judgment should not
exclude professional employees from the protections of the
Act.75
C. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER "PATIENT CARE"
The Circuit Courts of Appeal split on the issue of whether
the NLRB's "patient care" analysis was consistent with the
Act. The Second,76 Seventh,77 Eighth78 Ninth9 and Eleventh8 0
Circuits approved the Board's test while the Sixth Circuit
squarely rejected it.81 The courts upholding the findings of the
NLRB judged the Board's analysis to be a permissible
construction of the Act. The Seventh Circuit, for instance,
expressed support for the Board's analysis, stating that
"[s]upervision exercised in accordance with professional rather
than business norms is not supervision within the meaning of
the supervisor provision, for no issue of divided loyalties is
raised when supervision is required to conform to professional
standards rather than to the company's profit-maximizing
objectives."82
Representative of the position taken by the circuits
endorsing the Board's patient care analysis is the Second
Circuit's decision in Misericordia Hospital Medical Center v.
National Labor Relations Board.83 Before addressing the
substance of the Board's finding, the court noted that the
Board's determination was "entitled to special weight" and was
"to be accepted if it ha[d] 'warrant in the record' and a
reasonable basis in law."84 The court then proceeded to hold
that "[t]he evidence was sufficient to allow the Board to find
that in practice, as well as in theory, [the nurses'] authority
75. Beverly Enters., 313 N.L.R.B. at 492.
76. See Misericordia Hosp. Med. Ctr. v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 808 (2d Cir.
1980).
77. See NLRB v. Res-Care, Inc., 705 F.2d 1461 (7th Cir. 1983).
78. See Waverly-Cedar Falls Health Care Ctr. v. NLRB, 933 F.2d 626 (8th
Cir. 1991).
79. See NLRB v. Doctors' Hosp., 489 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1973).
80. See NLRB v. Walker County Med. Ctr., 722 F.2d 1535 (11th Cir.
1984).
81. See Health Care & Retirement Corp. of Am. v. NLRB, 987 F.2d 1256
(6th Cir. 1993); see also Hays, supra note 68, at 987.
82. Children's Habilitation Ctr. v. NLRB, 887 F.2d 130, 134 (7th Cir.
1989).
83. 623 F.2d 808 (2d Cir. 1980).
84. Id. at 816 (citations omitted).
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was primarily exercised in providing patient care, not in
supervising employees on behalf of management."85 The court
affirmed the Board's decision despite conceding that the head
nurse in question "had twenty-four hour responsibility for [her]
unit" and that "three assistant nurses and approximately ten
other nurses and ten aides and technicians" reported to her.8 6
The court explained that the nurse's supervisory respons-
ibilities, which included "the duty to assign and evaluate
professionals and nonprofessionals ... can justifiably be con-
sidered to be incidental to the head nurse's primary duty to
maintain the welfare of the patients in the unit."87
In sharp contrast to the approach of the court in
Misericordia, the Sixth Circuit took a firm stance against the
patient care analysis. In the case that would inspire the
Supreme Court to address the charge nurse question, the Sixth
Circuit recited the established rule in that circuit: "If a nurse's
actual functions performed met the statutory criteria for being
a supervisor, then the nurse would not be disqualified because
she was engaged in 'mere patient care.'"8 8 The court then
scolded the Board, stating, "It is unfortunate that this court
must repeatedly remind the Board that it is the courts, and not
the Board, who bear the final responsibility for interpreting the
law."89
The Sixth Circuit focused primarily on the first step of the
Board's three-step test. The court found that certain of the
nurses responsibilities made them supervisors under section
2(11) of the Act. These duties included assigning aides to
specific patients, finding a replacement when an aide fails to
report for work, offering aides the option of working overtime
when necessary and assigning or approving breaks and
lunches.90 The court then concluded that "[tihe job duties of
the LPNs ... require the use of independent judgment and are
taken in the interests of the employer."91
With the holdings of the Second and Sixth Circuits
representing the extreme poles of the circuit split, the issue
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of Am. v. NLRB, 987 F.2d 1256, 1260(1993) (citing Sixth Circuit precedent that undermines the Board's analysis).
89. Id.
90. See id. at 1261.
91. Id.
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was ripe for Supreme Court clarification. In 1994, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari and examined the Sixth
Circuit's rebuke of the patient care analysis.
D. HEALTH CARE AND THE TFALSE DICHOTOMY"
1. The Majority Opinion
In National Labor Relations Board v. Health Care &
Retirement Corporation of America,92 the Court applied a strictly
textual analysis to hold that the NLRB's "patient care" test
was inconsistent with the NLRA.93 In a five-to-four decision,
the Court held that the test created a "false dichotomy" in
distinguishing between the patients' interests and those of the
employer: "Patient care is the business of a nursing home, and
it follows that attending to the needs of the nursing home
patients, who are the employer's customers, is in the interest of
the employer."94
92. 511 U.S. 571 (1994). The Court was reviewing a decision by the Board
holding that three LPNs were entitled to the protection of the NLRA. The
nurses, who had been fired after complaining to an administrator about
alleged problems at their nursing home, were found not to be supervisors
under the Act notwithstanding the employer's contention that the LPNs were
vested with supervisory authority over the aides at the facility. See Health
Care & Retirement Corp. of Am., 306 N.L.R.B. 63 (1994).
93. See Health Care, 511 U.S. at 584. In the first paragraph of the
majority decision, Justice Kennedy makes it clear that the Court will employ
a strictly textual analysis by stating, "In this case, we decide the narrow
question whether the [Board's] test for determining if a nurse is a supervisor
is consistent with the statutory definition." Id. at 573; see also William N.
Eskridge, Jr., "Fetch Some Soupmeat", 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 2209, 2213 n.19
(1995) (citing Health Care as an example of the Supreme Court's "hard-to-
defend textual dogmatism").
94. Health Care, 511 U.S. at 577. The majority's reasoning in Health
Care closely parallels that expressed earlier by the Sixth Circuit in the cases
that created the circuit split on the issue. See NLRB v. Beacon Light
Christian Nursing Home, 825 F.2d 1076 (6th Cir. 1987). The Court also
quotes from another Sixth Circuit case and agrees that "the notion that
direction given to subordinate personnel to ensure that the employer's
nursing home customers receive 'quality care' somehow fails to qualify as
direction given 'in the interest of the employer' makes very little sense to us."
Health Care, 511 U.S. at 575 (quoting Beverly Cal. Corp. v. NLRB, 970 F.2d
1548, 1552 (6th Cir. 1992)); cf Beverly Enters., 313 N.L.R.B. 491, 494 (1993)
(finding the reasoning that the Court would later apply in Health Care "too
simplistic" and pointing out that the mere fact that actions of charge nurses
"usually are consistent with the entrepreneurial goals of the employer does
not detract from the professional or technical nature of the actions").
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The Court rejected all the Board's references to the legis-
lative history and the purpose of the Act.95 In an astonishingly
bold expression of judicial supremacy, the Court stated that
"[it is the function of the courts and not the Legislature, much
less a Committee of one House of the Legislature to say what
an enacted statute means."96 The Court dismissed the Board's
reliance on the legislative history of the 1974 amendments to
the NLRA by stating that "[tihose amendments did not alter
the test for supervisory status in the health care field." 97 The
Court also noted that Congress could not have intended to
approve of the Board's "patient care" analysis because "it is far
from clear that the Board in fact had a consistent test for
nurses before 1974."98 In conclusively rejecting the Board's use
of legislative history, the Court stated that "[ilf Congress
wishes to enact the policies of the Board, it can do so without
indirection."99
The Court quickly moved away from legislative history to
review judicial precedent. The majority in Health Care con-
demned the Board's patient care analysis as "inconsistent with
Yeshiva, [Packard], and the ordinary meaning of the phrase 'in
the interest of the employer."100 The majority emphasized the
similarities between the Board's "patient care" analysis and
the approach the Board took in Yeshiva.'0' The Court found
the "patient care" analysis substantially similar to the Board's
argument in Yeshiva that the "faculty authority 'was exercised
in the faculty's own interest rather than in the interest of the
university or [employer],'"102 and created the same imper-
missible dichotomy in Health Care as it had in Yeshiva. 0 3
The Health Care Court also cited Packard to support its
reading of the statute. 0 4 The Court likened the Board's
position to that taken by the dissenters in Packard who
95. See Health Care, 511 U.S. at 581-82. The Court notes the Board's
reliance on an "isolated statement in the 1974 Committee Report" to support
its conclusions and states that such reliance is misguided. Id.
96. Id. at 582 (quoting Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 566 (1988)).
97. Id. at 581-82.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 582.
100. Id.
10L See id. at 576.
102. Id. at 577.
103. See id. at 576-77.
104. See id. at 578.
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"advanced the proposition that the phrase ["in the interest of
the employer"] covered only 'those who acted for manage-
ment.., in formulating [and] executing its labor policies.'" 105
The Court then noted that the Court in Packard "determined
that acts within the scope of employment or on the authorized
business of the employer are in the interest of the employer."106
Thus, the Court concluded, the Board's "patient care" analysis
was inconsistent with Packard.107
The Court was particularly troubled that the Board did not
rely on the "in the interest of the employer" prong in other
supervisor cases concerning professionals, but had used its
"patient care" form of analysis only in the health care field.108
The Court stated that in "almost all" the cases in other
industries where the Board had drawn a "distinction between
authority arising from professional knowledge and authority
encompassing front-line management prerogatives.., the
Board's decisions did not result from manipulation of the
statutory phrase 'in the interest of the employer,' but instead
from a finding that the employee in question had not met the
other requirements for supervisory status under the Act."109
2. Justice Ginsburg's Dissent in Health, Care
Justice Ginsburg's well-crafted dissent in Health Care
stated that the Board's patient care analysis was not a "rud-
derless rule" reserved only for nurses, but rather a consistent
application of the Board's approach in other contexts.110
Justice Ginsburg noted that the Board "has employed the
distinction between authority arising from professional know-
ledge, on one hand, and authority encompassing front-line
management prerogatives, on the other" in analyzing cases
involving "doctors, faculty members, pharmacists, librarians,
social workers, lawyers, television station directors, archi-
tects.., and engineers.""' In contrast to the majority's use of
Yeshiva, the dissent cited the case to support the Board's
105. Id. (quoting Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485,496 (1947)
(Douglas, J., dissenting)).
106. Id.
107. See id.
108. Id. at 582.
109. Health Care, 511 U.S. at 583.
110. Id. at 590 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 590-92.
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general approach to the Act's application to professionals. 1 2
Justice Ginsburg emphasized the following passage from
Yeshiva:
The Board has recognized that employees whose decisionmaking is
limited to the routine discharge of professional duties in projects to
which they have been assigned cannot be excluded from coverage
even if union membership arguably may involve some divided loyalty.
Only if an employee's activities fall outside the scope of the duties
routinely performed by similarly situated professionals will he be
found aligned with management. We think these decisions
accurately capture the intent of Congress .... 113
The dissent went on to show that the Board had construed the
phrase "in the interest of the employer" "in diverse contexts, to
convey more than the obligation all employees have to further
the employer's business interests, indeed more than the
authority to assign and direct other employees pursuant to
relevant professional standards."' 14
3. The Anticipated Impact of Health Care
Although the Health Care decision was decided by the
narrowest of margins, the ruling was nonetheless expected to
alter significantly the way the NLRB determined the status of
charge nurses under the Act." 5 The majority attempted to
quash fears that the decision would have such far-reaching
implications: "Because the Board's interpretation of 'in the
interest of the employer' is for the most part confined to nurse
cases, our decision will have almost no effect outside that
context. Any parade of horribles about the meaning of this
decision for employees in other industries is thus quite
misplaced .... 116 Justice Ginsburg, however, disputed the
majority's statement and warned that "[tihe Court's opinion
has implications far beyond the nurses involved in this case. If
any person who may use independent judgment to assign tasks
to others or direct their work is a supervisor, then few
112. Id. at 592.
113. Id. (quoting NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672,690 n.30 (1980)).
114. Id. at 594.
115. See, e.g., Hays, supra note 68, at 988 (predicting that the impact of
the Supreme Court's Health Care decision would be felt immediately in the
health care profession, causing employers to withdraw recognition from
unions representing nurses).
116. Health Care, 511 U.S. at 583-84.
1999] 1945
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
professionals employed by organizations subject to the Act will
receive its protections."' 17
E. THE NLRB's REACTION TO HEALTH CARE
Despite Justice Ginsburg's predictions that the Health
Care decision would dramatically alter the Board's approach to
supervisor cases, and to health care professionals in particular,
the Board continued to find charge nurses to be non-
supervisors. In Nymed ls the Board announced its intended
response to Health Care. The Board first acknowledged the
demise of the "patient care" analysis, but emphasized the
narrowness of the Health Care holding.119 It next noted that
117. Id. at 598 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Dana J. Chase, Note,
National Labor Relations Board v. Health Care & Retirement Corporation of
America: The Debate Continues As to Whether Nurses Are Professionals or
Supervisors, 4 J. PHARM. & L. 225, 235 (1995) (concluding that Health Care
could likely have a negative impact on other professionals as well as nurses);
Woodson, supra note 36, at 301 (noting that the Health Care decision was
widely criticized by unions and labor lawyers who feared it would have wide-
ranging effects on other employees who perform limited supervisory
functions).
118. Nymed, Inc. (Ten Broeck Commons), 320 N.L.R.B. 806 (1996). The
Nymed decision draws extensively from an earlier Board decision, Beverly
Enterprises, 313 N.L.R.B. 491 (1993). The Beverly Enterprises decision is
interesting because it arose in late 1993, after the Circuit split had developed
on the issue, when it was clear that the Supreme Court was likely to grant
certiorari on the question. The long, thoughtful decision by Chairman
Stephens and Members Devaney and Raudaubaugh serves two important
functions. First, it reads as an effective amicus brief to the Supreme Court
defending the Board's "patient care" analysis-anticipating many of the
objections raised by the appellant in Health Care. See id. at 493. Indeed, it
appears from the repeated cites to Beverly Enterprises contained in Health
Care that the Court accepted Beverly Enterprises as a clear statement of the
Board's position. See Health Care, 511 U.S. at 574, 588. Second, it provides a
preview of the "independent judgment test" that would succeed the "patient
care" test:
Our "patient care" analysis in the health care industry is not
materially different from that used in the "leadman" cases, albeit we
have usually employed different terminology in a setting in which the
"shop floor" is a patient ward and the "product" is patient care rather
than, say, ball bearings. Charge nurses in hospitals and nursing
homes are, in our experience, on a par with "leadmen7 [outside the
health care industry] .... For the same reasons we find, in other
settings, that the authority to give such assignments and directions,
without more, does not confer supervisory status, so also we find that
the possession of that authority... does not confer supervisory
status in the health care industry.
Id.
119. See id. at 810.
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"the Court agreed with the Board's argument that phrases
such as 'independent judgment' and 'responsibly to direct' are
ambiguous and thus the Board needs a wide latitude in its
application of these indicia to various categories of
employees." 120 In sum, the Board interpreted Health Care as
an admonishment by the Court to treat health care profession-
als the same as all other professionals.' 2 '
Accordingly, the Board announced that from then on, "[un
determining whether [charge nurses direction of work meets
the definition of Section 2(11), we shall decide whether such
direction requires the use of independent judgment or whether
such directions are merely routine."22 The Board in Nymed
applied its reconfigured analysis and concluded that the forty-
five LPNs in question did not exercise independent judgment
when assigning, directing, disciplining, evaluating, and
transferring other employees, and therefore found that the
nurses were not supervisors under section 2(11).123
The "independent judgment" analysis, rather than
emphasizing the question of whose interest is served by the
alleged supervisory activity, asks simply whether the nurse is
exercising independent judgment in carrying out the act.124
The Board distinguishes between decisions made relating to
supervisory duties that require the nurse to exercise individual
discretion and those nominally supervisory tasks so clearly
dictated by employer policy as to be merely routine and not
really "decisions" at all. 125 In a case decided in 1996, the Board
illuminated this distinction:
120. Id.
121. See id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 806; see also Peter R. Macleod, Status of Nurses As
"Supervisors" Under the National Labor Relations Act: Nymed, Inc., 38 B.C. L.
REV. 323, 326-32 (1997) (detailing the Board's holding in Nymed and noting
that the case is "important because the Board purported to enunciate the
guidelines by which it will analyze future health care supervisor cases").
. 124. See Nymed, 320 N.L.R.B. at 809 ("To meet [the § 2(11)1 definition, a
person needs to possess only one of the specific criteria listed, or the authority
to effectively recommend, so long as the performance of that function is not
routine but requires the use of independent judgment.").
125. Many commentators have disapproved of the Board's new test, saying
it has the same shortcomings of its previous "patient care" analysis. See, e.g.,
Ann M. Benedetto, Note, NLRB v. Health Care and Retirement Corp. of
America: Analysis and Disapproval of the National Labor Relations Board's
Determination of Supervisory Status of Nurses, 12 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
POLY 701, 730 (1996) (contending that the Board's "independent judgment"
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when a professional gives directions to other employees, those
directions do not make the professional a supervisor merely because
the professional used judgment in deciding what instructions to give.
For example, designing a patient treatment plan may involve
substantial professional judgment, but may result in wholly routine
direction to the staff that implements that plan.'1
F. THE CiRcuIT COURTS' INTERPRETATION OF HEALTH CARE
Not only did the Health Care decision fail to deter the
NLRB, it also failed to resolve the circuit split. The division
among the Circuit Courts of Appeals on whether the Board's
test for supervisory status in the health care setting is more
pronounced now than it was before the Health Care decision.
Prior to Health Care, only the Sixth Circuit had rejected the
Board's "patient care" analysis. Now, the Third, Sixth,127 and
Seventh128 Circuits have lined up against the Board's new
"independent judgment" test. Reflecting the dissension that
exists with regard to the issue, the Fourth Circuit has
alternately followed 129 and rejected 130 the Board's new test.
analysis is "in direct contradiction to the explicit wording of the NLRA");
King, supra note 74, at 356 (describing the Board's new test as merely "a
disguised restatement of the Board's 'patient care' analysis"); Macleod, supra
note 123, at 334 (suggesting that the Board's current analysis is "unclear",
and "ignores important precedent"). But see Colleen A. Manning, Status of
Charge Nurses As "Supervisors" Under the National Labor Relations Act:
Providence Hospital & Alaska Nurses Ass'n, 38 B.C. L. REV. 335, 346 (1997)
(describing two 1996 NLRB decisions finding nurses not to be supervisors and
suggesting that such an interpretation is "the most fair and consistent with
the statute").
126. Providence Hosp., 320 N.L.R.B. 717 (1996).
127. See Edgewood Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. NLRB, No. 96-6236, 1998 WL
96595, at *4 (6th Cir. Feb. 24, 1998).
128. See NLRB v. Grancare, Inc., 158 F.3d. 407 (7th Cir. 1998), enforced,
170 F.3d 662 (7th Cir. 1999). The court notes that when this case was
originally decided by the Board under its "patient care" analysis (the case was
remanded after the Health Care decision was issued), the Board found that
the nurses did exercise some "independent judgment." Because the Board, on
remand, "reached the same result but relied on a different statutory factor,"
the court found "little reason to accord significant deference to the Board." Id.
at 413.
129. See Beverly Enters. v. NLRB, 136 F.3d 361, 363 (4th Cir. 1998)
(approving of the Board's analysis and finding adequate support in the record
that charge nurses were not exercising independent judgment in their
performance of routine job duties), rev'd, 165 F.3d 290 (4th Cir. 1999).
130. See Glenmark Assocs. v. NLRB, 147 F.3d 333 (4th Cir. 1998). In
Glenmark Associates, Judge Williams launched a scathing attack on the
Board's new test in a lengthy footnote:
This issue of the supervisory status of nurses serves as another
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After that court's recent en banc decision in Beverly Enterprises
v. NLRB, 13, however, it appears that, for the time being, seven
out of twelve jurists on the Fourth Circuit have rejected the
independent judgment analysis.132 On the opposite side, the
Eighth,133 Ninth134 and District of Columbia 135 Circuits have
accepted the Board's formulation.
1. Description of Opposition
The circuits that have rejected the Board's analysis have
adopted the Health Care Court's one-dimensional textual
approach to the Act. These courts refused to acknowledge the
ambiguity in the language of section 2(11) or to consider the
purpose of the Act in their decisions.
As it was in opposing the Board's "patient care" analysis,
the Sixth Circuit is the standard bearer for the courts that
example of the NLRB's continuing effort to modify the plain language
of § 2(11)....
We" are not the first court to wonder whether this new
interpretation is an end run around an unfavorable Supreme Court
decision in order to promote policies of broadening the coverage of the
Act, maximizing the number of unions certified, and increasing the
number of unfair labor practice findings it makes rather than
explicate a well-reasoned interpretation of the NLRA.
... ITihe Board should reconsider its single-minded pursuit of its
policy goals without regard for the supervisory role of the Third
Branch.
Id. at 339-40 n.8. The court concluded that the Board's "independent judg-
ment" analysis was "incorrect" in that it "fail[ed] to appreciate the distinction
between using skill and professional judgment to perform a complex job and
using related skills and judgment to manage others." Id. at 340.
131. 165 F.3d 290 (4th Cir. 1999).
132. See id.
133. See Beverly Enters. v. NLRB, 148 F.3d 1042, 1045 (8th Cir. 1998)
(approving of the NLRB's "independent judgment" test and noting that the
Health Care decision did not affect the test previously established in Schnuck
Markets v. NLRB, 961 F.2d 700, 703 (8th Cir. 1992), which did not rely on the
"Patient care" element).
134 See Providence Alaska Med. Ctr. v. NLRB, 121 F.3d 548, 552 (9th Cir.
1997) (accepting and applying the Board's "independent judgment" test). The
dissent in Providence Alaska Medical Center accused the Board of "seriously
distort[ing] the statute" and insisted that "[wihat the Board has done is
exactly analogous to what it did in its earlier test disapproved in Health
Care." Id. at 556 (Noonan, J., dissenting); see also King, supra note 74, at 350.
135. See Beverly Enters. v. NLRB, 129 F.3d 1269, 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(agreeing with the Board's finding that the employer failed to show that the
charge nurses in question exercised supervisory authority).
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have rejected the "independent judgment" analysis.136 The
Sixth Circuit's view of the Board's analysis is accurately
summarized in the following passage:
Just as the supposed taint of "patient care" does not, in our view,
mean that individuals who responsibly direct others in providing
such care are somehow acting other than in the interest of the
employer, the use of independent judgment does not become "merely
routine" when exercised in the interest of patients housed in the
employer's nursing home. 37
Similarly, in NLRB v. Grancare, Inc.,138 the Seventh Circuit
referred to the Board's "well attested manipulativeness" in
supervisory cases concerning charge nurses and afforded the
Board's interpretation little deference.139 The court held that
the LPNs' "independence" was not reduced merely because
they relied on their professional expertise in carrying out
supervisory tasks.140
The Fourth Circuit has recently joined the Seventh and
Sixth Circuits in opposing the Board's independent judgment
analysis. The court's en banc decision in Beverly Enterprises v.
NLRB141 represents the most thoughtful, complete, and
reasoned rejection of the Board's analysis on record. Unlike
the Sixth and Seventh Circuits, the Beverly Enterprises court
described in detail the three-part test applied by the Board,
and the history of the Board's interpretation of section 2(11) as
applied to charge nurses from the "patient care" analysis
through Health Care and the emergence of the independent
judgment analysis. 142  The court found that the Board's
position that LPNs are not supervisors manifested an
"irrational consistency" even though LPNs are the highest-
ranking employees present for a majority of the time and can
recommend disciplinary action.143 The court quoted its own
precedent, noting that the Fourth Circuit is "not the first court
136. See, e.g., Mid-America Care Found. v. NLRB, 148 F.3d 638, 640 (6th
Cir. 1998) (noting that "in six prior reported decisions, we have vacated NLRB
decisions that found nurses not to be supervisors within the meaning of the
NLRA"); Grancare, Inc. v. NLRB, 137 F.3d 372, 376 (6th Cir. 1998).
137. Edgewood Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. NLRB, No. 96-6236, 1998 WL 96595,
at *4 (6th Cir. Feb. 24, 1998).
138. 158 F.3d 407 (7th Cir. 1998), enforced, 170 F.3d 662 (7th Cir. 1999).
139. See id. at 413.
140. See id. at 414.
141. 165 F.3d 290 (4th Cir. 1999).
142 See id. at 294-96.
143. Id. at 295-96.
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to wonder whether this new interpretation is an end run
around an unfavorable Supreme Court decision in order to
provide policies of broadening the coverage of the Act."1" The
Beverly Enterprises court concluded that assigning work,
directing, and disciplining are not simply professional medical
tasks but are instead "part and parcel of what it means to be a
manager and a supervisor."145
2. Circuit Courts Favorable to the Board's "Independent
Judgment" Analysis
Taking an opposing view, the D.C. Circuit has expressed
its support for the independent judgment analysis. The D.C.
Circuit identified the key issue in determining supervisory
status: independent judgment depends on the "degree of
discretion" needed to perform the statutory duties, and not
upon a bright line dividing complete independence from mere
obedience.'4 Likewise, the Eighth Circuit has approved of the
Board's current approach to charge nurse cases, affirming in
one case the Board's finding that the LPNs in question "merely
follow[ed] routine procedures while they [were] 'in charge."147
The court also noted that although the nurses reassigned
duties and re-prioritized work when changes in patient care or
personnel dictated, "such authority [did] not require the use of
independent judgment but [was] instead narrowly
circumscribed by an elaborate system of procedures, policies,
and protocol regarding patient care." 48
Finally, the Ninth Circuit has endorsed the independent
judgment test. In finding that charge nurses were exercising
their professional judgment rather than independent
judgment, the court noted that "[e]ven though a supervisory
nurse may not be physically present during the evening, night,
and weekend shifts, a supervisory nurse is on call at all times
during these shifts. This indicates that the ultimate respon-
sibility rests with the supervisory nurse, not with the charge
nurse."'149
144- Id. at 296 (quoting Glenmark Assocs. v. NLRB, 147 F.3d 333, 340 n.8
(4th Cir. 1998)).
145. Id. at 298.
146. Beverly Enters. v. NLRB, 129 F.3d 1269, 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
147. Beverly Enters. v. NLRB, 148 F.3d 1042, 1048 (8th Cir. 1998).
148. Id. at 1047.
149. Providence Alaska Med. Ctr. v. NLRB, 121 F.3d 548, 555 (9th Cir.
1997).
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Despite the Sixth Circuit's strong position against the
"independent judgment" test, there is a quiet mutiny swelling
within its ranks.1 50 Although compelled to concur with the
majority by controlling Sixth Circuit precedent, two judges
have recently expressed their discomfort and even displeasure
with the circuit's continued rejection of the Board's latest test
through its use of a strict textual approach.' 51 One of these
dissenters, Judge Moore, has voiced her "fear [that the Sixth
Circuit's] precedent obliterates any distinction between those
with minor supervisory duties and true supervisors" in
contravention to the purpose of the Act and the intent of
Congress.1 52 Judge Moore noted that her colleagues' broad
categorical definition of independent judgment to encompass
"all discretionary or reasoned decision-making" would limit the
Act's protections to very few professionals.' 53 Judge Moore
applauded the Board's "effort to harmonize Congress's clear
intent to exclude supervisors from the Act's coverage while
including professionals within the class of covered employ-
ees."' 54 The dissent concluded that insofar as the Board's
construction of the statute was a permissible one, the court was
compelled to defer to the Board's interpretation. 55
III. THE SUPREME COURTS TEXTUAL ANALYSIS
FAILS TO EFFECT THE INTENT OF CONGRESS
AND THE PURPOSE OF THE NLRA
The tension created by the overlapping definitions of
"supervisor" and "professional employee" cannot be justly re-
solved through a strictly textual interpretation of the National
Labor Relations Act. When the text of the Act is considered as
a whole, ambiguities and inconsistencies in its language frus-
150. See Mid-America Care Found. v. NLRB, 148 F.3d 638 (6th Cir. 1998);
Grancare, Inc. v. NLRB, 137 F.3d 372, 377 (6th Cir. 1998); Caremore, Inc. v.
NLRB, 129 F.3d 365, 371 (6th Cir. 1997); Manor West, Inc. v. NLRB, 60 F.3d
1195, 1198 (6th Cir. 1995).
151. See Grancare, 137 F.3d at 377 (Jones, J., concurring) (expressing
concern over the "apparent ease by which [the court] discounts the findings of
the Board"); id. at 386 (Moore, J., concurring) ("Despite my serious misgivings
regarding this circuit's prior holdings in cases examining the supervisory
status of charge nurses, I am bound by our precedent.").
152. Id. at 386 (Moore, J., concurring).
153. Id. at 381.
154. Id. at 382.
155. See id. at 386 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)).
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trate such a narrow approach. On the one hand, the language
of the Act communicates the clear desire of Congress to exclude
from coverage workers who are truly supervisors representing
the employer's interest in the workplace.15 6 On the other hand,
the Act explicitly states Congress's desire to protect
professional employees who may exhibit some of the same
characteristics as the excluded supervisors.'
57
Following Health Care, the Board's supervisor analysis
requires an affirmative response to three questions:'
58
(1) Does the worker perform any one of the twelve
activities enumerated in section 2(11)?5 9
(2) Does the worker perform these activities in the
interest of the employer?
(3) Does the exercise of authority require the use of
"independent judgment" or is it instead "of a merely
routine or clerical nature?"160
Consistent with the NLRA's purpose to facilitate and protect
workers' right to organize, the Board has used this test to
apply the supervisor definition narrowly. The Board has held
that although nursing professionals often possess the authority
to perform some of the tasks contained in Section 11 of the Act,
such authority does not always require the exercise of
independent judgment.161
In one representative case, the Board refused to exclude as
supervisors LPNs who had the authority to assign work to
aides, to designate lunch and break times, to assign extra
duties to aides, and to direct and monitor the work of aides. 62
156. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1994).
157. See id. § 152(12).
158. See id. § 152(11); NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of Am.,
511 U.S. 517, 574 (1994); see also supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.
159. That is, the power to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, promote,
discharge, assign work, discipline, responsibly direct work, or adjust
grievances. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(11); see also Health Care, 511 U.S. at 574;
Grancare, Inc. v. NLRB, 158 F.3d 372, 411 (6th Cir. 1998) (emphasizing that a
worker need only possess the authority to perform one of the twelve listed
activities).
160. See Health Care, 511 U.S. at 574 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 152(11)).
161. See supra notes 122-26 and accompanying text.
162. See Nymed, Inc. (Ten Broeck Commons), 320 NLRB 806, 813-14
(1996). The Board also noted that the LPNs in question had many
responsibilities that did not involve supervising aides. It concluded that "the
LPNs' supervision of [aides] is narrowly circumscribed to giving rather
general, routine directions to lesser skilled employees in order to maintain the
quality of their work. This type of authority is typical of that of the industrial
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The Board explained that nurses who are using their
"technical expertise and judgment to prepare a comprehensive
health care plan for each resident" do not exhibit "independent
judgment" when they direct aides in carrying out the plan. 163
The Board's three-pronged test is well-suited to balancing
an employer's interest in maintaining a core of management
loyalists against the employee's statutory right to organize and
bargain collectively over the terms and conditions of
employment. Unfortunately, the Health Care decision es-
sentially shortened the test by rendering moot the question of
whether the supervisory task is performed "in the interest of
the employer." 64
A. HEALTH CARE'S FAILUREs
The Court, by rejecting the Board's "patient care" analysis,
failed to appreciate the subtle distinction the Board was
attempting to make between acting in the interest of the
employer as a supervisor and acting in the interest of patient
care as a professional. 165 The Board was attempting to
articulate with its patient care analysis that some tasks
performed by health care professionals that appear "super-
visory" in some contexts are merely incidental to the routine
performance of their professional duties and are thus
inexorably linked to the job.166
1. Health Care's Strict Textual Analysis Is Inappropriate
The Supreme Court's analysis failed by considering only
the second prong of the Board's test. In contrast to the NLRB's
thoughtful analysis, the Supreme Court begged the question.
Rather than attempting to discern the delicate distinction
Congress was attempting to make in drafting the amendment
which contained the overlapping definitions of supervisor and
"professional employee," the Court interpreted this language as
completely immaterial.167
straw boss and leadman, skilled employees with only limited authority, who
are routinely excluded from the definition of supervisor." Id- at 811-12(citations omitted).
163. Id. at 811.
164. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 110-14 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 50-68 and accompanying text.
167. The only example provided in Health Care of an employee who does
not perform supervisory duties in the interest of the employer is a union
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Despite the overlapping definitions of supervisor and
professional employee, the duties of the charge nurses more
closely resemble those of the industrial "strawbosses,
leadmen... and other minor supervisory employees" whom
Congress intended to protect under the NLRA.168 The Board
interpreted the Act as excluding only employees possessing the
authority to act as a proxy for the employer in the workplace.
True supervisors, according to the Board, made independent
decisions affecting the employment conditions of other
employees. 169 The direction of nursing aides' work that is
incidental to the conscientious performance of the charge
nurses' duties ought not to deny them the protections of the
Act.
2. The Court Misread Its Own Precedent
The Supreme Court in Health Care misleadingly suggested
that its decision was supported by Packard Motor Car Co. v.
National Labor Relations Board,170 "the case that gave impetus
to the statutory provision now before us." 171 Packard, like
Health Care, interpreted the phrase "in the interest of the
employer" broadly. Unlike Health Care, however, Packard did
so to protect the rights of workers to organize under the Act,
not to exclude workers from its protection.172
The question before the Court in Packard was whether
industrial foremen, as a class, were entitled to collective
bargaining rights under the NLRA. After analyzing the text
(particularly the meaning of "in the interest of the employer")
and purpose of the Act, the Court was compelled to affirm the
Board's interpretation: the answer to the question was "yes."
After all, it was the Packard Court's decision to resolve the
steward authorized to adjust grievances. NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement
Corp. of Am., 511 U.S. 517, 579 (1994). If Congress had intended to exclude
only union stewards from the definition of supervisor, it could have done so
simply and explicitly.
168. See supra note 43 and accompanying text; see also Beverly Enters. v.
NLRB, 136 F.3d 353, 358 (4th Cir. 1998) ("Lest the chiefs far outnumber the
Indians, Congress crafted § 2(11)'s enigmatic standard, intending to exempt
true management from the Act while still protecting the § 7 rights of "straw
bosses, leadmen and set-up men, and other minor supervisory employees.")
(citing NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 280-81 (1974)).
169. See Rabban, supra note 36, at 1803.
170. 330 U.S. 485 (1947).
171. Health Care, 511 U.S. at 578.
172. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
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textual ambiguity in favor of workers that prompted Congress
to amend the NLRA to avoid the negative consequences of
management unions. The Packard Court considered the
remedial purpose of the Act in reaching its conclusion. 7 3
Furthermore, the Packard Court deferred to the Board's
interpretation in expanding the coverage of the Act. The
Packard Court noted that the decision as to what constitutes
an appropriate bargaining unit "involves of necessity a large
measure of informed discretion and the decision of the Board, if
not final, is rarely to be disturbed."174 Health Care, on the
other hand, disregarded the Board's broad interpretation and
effectively restricted the coverage of the Act.175 In short,
Packard and Health Care interpreted the same statutory
language to reach opposite conclusions about two similar
groups of workers.1 76
The Court's reliance on Yeshiva 177 in the Health Care
decision is equally misplaced 78  The university faculty
members at issue in Yeshiva were excluded by the "judicially
implied exclusion for 'managerial employees' who are involved
in developing and enforcing employer policy."'179 Although
noting that the supervisor and managerial employee
exemptions share the same concern-that an employer is
entitled to the undivided loyalty of its representatives-the
Court explicitly refused to resolve the "supervisor" issue 80
173. See id.
174 330 U.S. at 491.
175. See Health Care, 511 U.S. at 582.
176. The Court in Packard described the supervisory duties of foremen
this way:
Foremen carry the responsibility for maintaining quantity and
quality of production, subject, of course, to the overall control and
supervision of the management. Hiring is done by the labor relations
department, as is the discharging and laying off of employees. But
the foremen are provided with forms and with detailed lists of
penalties to be applied in cases of violations of discipline, and initiate
recommendations for promotion, demotion and discipline.
330 U.S. at 487.
177. NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672 (1980).
17& See supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
179. Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 682 (citations omitted). Managerial employees
were recognized as "so clearly outside the Act that no specific exclusionary
provision was thought necessary." NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267,
283 (1974).
180. Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 682.
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To be sure, the arguments advanced by the Board in
Health Care and Yeshiva were similar. The Board contended
that the professionals at issue in both cases were performing
managerial or supervisory duties in their professional capacity
and not in the interest of the employer. There are, however,
some significant differences in the underlying facts of the two
cases. To the extent that the Board argued in Yeshiva that "a
faculty member exercising independent judgment acts
primarily in his own interest and therefore does not represent
the interest of his employer," 8 1 the analyses in the two cases is
substantially similar. The Yeshiva Court, however, granted
substantial weight to the policy basis for the managerial
exemption: preventing divided loyalty. Yeshiva discussed the
issue at length, describing the "acute" problem of divided
loyalty in the university setting.18 2 In contrast, the Court in
Health Care limited its consideration of divided loyalty to a
single sentence, concluding vaguely that "[niursing home
owners may want to implement policies to ensure that patients
receive the best possible care despite potential adverse reaction
from employees working under the nurses' direction."18 3
The faculty members at issue in Yeshiva performed
dramatically different roles at the university than do charge
nurses at a nursing home. The faculty members met regularly
to address institutional and professional concerns. 184 The
faculty determined the university's curriculum, grading
system, admission and matriculation standards, academic
calendars, and course schedules.185 They also made decisions
affecting faculty hiring, tenure, termination, and promotion.18 6
The Board argued in Yeshiva that although faculty members
may seem to exercise managerial authority, the faculty were
not sufficiently "aligned with management" to exempt them
181. Id. at 688.
182. Id. at 687-90 (stating that divided loyalty is a particularly severe
problem where "[t]he university requires faculty participation in governance
because professional expertise is indispensable to the formulation and
implementation of academic policy").
183. NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of Am., 511 U.S. 517, 581
(1994).
184. Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 676.
185. See id. The Court noted that the faculty possess, and occasionally
exercise, the authority to overrule decisions made by college administrators.
See id. at 676 n.4.
186. See id. at 677.
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from the Act. 87 One of the pillars of Yeshiva's rejection of the
Board's independent professional judgment test was the
Court's inability to identify a consistent application of the test
in any of the Board's prior decisions.188
The charge nurses at issue in Health Care obviously did
not possess the same sort of managerial authority as the
faculty members in Yeshiva. Accordingly, both the Board and
the Court relied on the supervisory exemption and not the
implied managerial exception employed in Yeshiva. Unlike the
test the Board applied in Yeshiva and other faculty cases, the
Board's "in the interest of the employer" analysis had been
applied consistently over a long period of time in various
contexts.18 9 The dissent in Health Care noted that the "in the
interest of the employer" language has been interpreted
consistently in cases involving not only nurses, but also social
workers, pharmacists, and attorneys.190
The most obvious indication that Health Care cites Yeshiva
for a proposition the latter fails to support is found in a
statement limiting the scope of Yeshiva's holding. The Court
noted in Yeshiva that Board decisions recognizing "that
employees whose decisionmaking is limited to the routine
discharge of professional duties in projects to which they have
been assigned cannot be excluded from coverage even if union
membership arguably may involve some divided loyalty...
accurately capture the intent of Congress."' 91 The Court listed
as an example of such permissible constructions of the Act
decisions in the "health-care context" in which the Board has
employed its "patient care" analysis.192
By selectively reading its own precedents in Packard and
Yeshiva, the Health Care Court creates the illusion that its
decision rested on solid judicial foundations. With these two
supportive legs knocked out, the Health Care decision is left
teetering on the edge of total collapse.
187. See id. at 683-84.
188. See id. at 685 (stating that the independent professional judgment
test "does not appear clearly in any Board opinion").
189. See Health Care, 511 U.S. 594-95 & n.13 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
190. See id.
191. Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 690.
192. See id. at 690 n.30. The Court also noted that Congress "expressly
approved" the Board's test in 1974. Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 93-766, at 6
(1974)).
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B. CIRCUIT COURTS REJECTING THE "INDEPENDENT JUDGMENT"
TEST ARE BLINDLY FOLLOWING HEALTH CARE'S TEXTUAL
ANALYSIS
The courts may not substitute their own judgment for that
of the NLRB when the choice is "between two fairly conflicting
views, even though the court would justifiably have made a
different choice had the matter been before it de novo."19 3 The
Board is entitled to judicial deference when it interprets
ambiguous language in the Act.194 Yet some courts clearly
have imposed their own interpretation of the Act in reversing
the Board. For example, the Board has held that charge
nurses with the authority to send an aide home for
drunkenness or patient abuse are not necessarily super-
visors.195 This type of conduct is such a flagrant violation of
employer policies that a charge nurse need not exercise any
independent judgment in sending the worker home.196 The
Third Circuit, however, could "see little to commend a
distinction based upon how flagrant the violation happens to
be."197 The court found instead that a charge nurse's action in
sending an aide home "could not be considered a routine or
clerical function; it consists of a Charge Nurse imposing her
independent judgment upon, and exercising her authority over
a subordinate, however subtle or flagrant the violation."198
In Caremore, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board,199 the
Board determined that charge nurses who "exercised their
authority to assign, direct, evaluate, and recommend discipline
only occasionally" and "sporadically" were the type of minor
supervisory employees Congress intended to protect under the
Act.200 The Sixth Circuit cast aside the Board's interpretation,
stating that "[i]t is the existence of [a statutorily listed]
authority that counts under the statute, and not the frequency
193. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474,488 (1951).
194. See Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 536 (1992).
195. See Beverly Enters., 313 N.L.R.B. 491, 497 (1993).
196. See id. (finding that flagrant acts such as drunkenness and patient
abuse "are obvious violations of the employers' policies and speak for
themselves").
197. Passavant Retirement & Health Ctr. v. NLRB, 149 F.3d 243, 249 (3rd
Cir. 1998).
198. Id.
199. 129 F.3d 365 (6th Cir. 1997).
200. Id. at 369.
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of its exercise."' 201 After imposing its interpretation, supported
by Sixth Circuit precedent, to find the charge nurses to be
supervisors, the court seized the opportunity "to remind the
NLRB that it is the courts, and not the [NLRBI, who bear the
final responsibility for interpreting the law."202
The courts that reject the Board's "independent judgment"
analysis do not consider the realities of the workplace in
reaching their conclusions. They instead rely on a strict
reading of the section 2(11) criteria in determining whether a
charge nurse is a supervisor. The NLRB, on the other hand,
argues that the question is not so simple. The Board
recognizes a class of workers in between front-line employees
and true supervisors. The existence of this middle class of
workers has long been acknowledged by the Board to consist of
"employees who possess greater skills or experience than their
fellow employees [and who] often give instructions and
directions to other employees on the shop floor regarding what
to do next."203 These workers were traditionally termed
"leadmen."20 4  Historically, leadmen have been permitted to
unionize under the Act because they have "been found to be
lacking in supervisory authority even though they direct
employees' work, assign tasks, convey reports on employees'
progress, and report rules infractions."2 05
The question the Board seeks to answer with its
"independent judgment" analysis is the same as that previous-
ly addressed via the "patient care" approach: are charge nurses
vested with "genuine management prerogatives?" 206 The courts
rejecting the Board's analysis view the Board's attempt to
reach the same result in charge nurse cases after Health Care
that it did before that decision as "an end run around an
unfavorable Supreme Court decision. 207 These courts ignore
the fact that the Board is obliged to interpret the language of
201. Id. (quoting Beverly Cal Corp. v. NLRB, 970 F.2d 1548, 1550 n.3
(1992)).
202. Id. at 371 (quoting Health Care & Retirement Corp. v. NLRB, 987
F.2d 1256, 1260 (6th Cir. 1993)).
203. Beverly Enters., 313 N.L.R.B. 491, 494 (1993).
204. See id.; see also supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
205. Beverly Enters., 313 N.L.R.B. at 494 n.13 (citing Higgins Indus., 150
N.L.R.B. 106, 111-12 (1964), among other Board decisions).
206. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
207. Glenmark Assocs. v. NLRB, 147 F.3d 333, 340 n.8 (4th Cir. 1998).
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the Act, whenever possible, to further the mission of the Act-
to protect the rights of working people to unionize.
The Board reads Health Care as leaving room for the
identification of employees who fit into the middle or leadman
category.208 Applying a textual approach of its own, the Board
emphasizes the narrowness of Health Care's holding.209
According to the Board, Health Care rejected the Board's
distortion of the statutory language of section 2(11), but not the
policy represented by the patient care analysis.210  In
Providence Hospital the Board condensed Health Care's
holding:
In Sum, the Court held that the Board's patient care analysis relying
on "in the interest of the employer" was an impermissible shortcut,
that there are no hard-and-fast rules, but that the Board should
analyze the 12 listed statutory indicia in detail and on a case-by-case
basis. 21 ,
The Board also picked up on Health Care's suggestion that
other admittedly ambiguous language was fair game for the
Board in developing an alternative analysis.212 Providence
Hospital introduced the "independent judgment" analysis by
stating that "[t]he Board analyzes each case in order to
differentiate between the exercise of independent judgment
and the giving of routine instructions, between effective
recommendation and forceful suggestion, and between the
appearance of supervision and supervision in fact."213
Some of the circuit courts read Health Care differently. In
Beverly Enterprises,214 the Fourth Circuit advanced the notion
that the Board was exhibiting an impermissible "policy bias" in
its recent decisions.215 The court did not cite any specific
holding of Health Care to support this argument, but seemed to
infer that Health Care's approach precluded the Board's
consideration of congressional intent and statutory purpose in
interpreting the Act.216 Under this reading, it would be impos-
208. See Nymed, Inc. (Ten Broeck Commons), 320 N.L.R.B. 806, 810
(1996).
209. See id.
210. See id.
211. Providence Hosp., 320 N.L.R.B. 717, 727 (1996).
212. See Nymed, 320 N.L.R.B. at 810.
213. Providence Hosp., 320 N.L.R.B. at 725.
214. 165 F.3d 290 (4th Cir. 1999).
215. See id. at 296.
216. See id. The court quoted the statement in Health Care that "[it] is the
function of the courts... to say what an enacted statute means." Id. (quoting
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sible for the Board to give effect to Congress's recognition of the
middle level "strawbosses and minor supervisory employees."2 7
Not only is this reading of Health Care unjustifiably broad, but
it also is in direct conflict with the role of the NLRB in
interpreting and applying the Act.218
C. THE "INDEPENDENT JUDGMENT" TEST IS CONSISTENT WITH
HEALTH CARE
1. The Supreme Court Did Not Preclude the "Independent
Judgment" Analysis
The Board followed the instructions handed down in
Health Care by skipping over the second prong of the super-
visor test and moving directly to the independent judgment
analysis.219 The refocused test accomplishes essentially the
same result as the old one, but it relies on statutory language
the Court found more acceptable.
The Court in Health Care invited the Board to modify its
test to focus on the "independent judgment" language of the
statute.220 The Court took care to note that while it found no
ambiguity in the "interest of the employer" language, it
considered other phrases in section 2(11) (such as "independent
judgment") ambiguous.221 Accordingly, the Court said the
NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of Am., 511 U.S. 571,582 (1994)).
217. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
218. See Russell L. Weaver, Some Realism About Chevron, 58 MO. L. REV.
129, 172-73 (1993) (noting that "several post-Chevron decisions [suggest] that,
if an interpretive question involves a policy choice, then the agency
responsible for the regulatory scheme should be free to make that choice").
219. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1994). Prior to Health Care, however, the
Board generally ended its analysis after finding that the duty was not
performed in the interest of the employer in the second part of the test. After
Health Care, the Board has been forced to continue its analysis and ask the
third question. See, e.g., Beverly Enters. v. NLRB, 136 F.3d 353, 357-58 (4th
Cir. 1998) (explaining the Board's three part test and noting that Health Care
requires the Board to extend its analysis to the "independent judgment" test
which is "by far the most difficult"). But see Providence Alaska Med. Ctr. v.
NLRB, 121 F.3d 548, 556 (9th Cir. 1997) (Noonan, J., dissenting) (claiming
that it was not until after Health Care's rejection of the patient care analysis
that the independent judgment test saw "the light of day," and that[d]eference should not be accorded an interpretation that [the Board] has
taken 50 years to reach and... [that] has been brought forward as an end run
around [Health Care]").
220. See Health Care, 511 U.S. at 579.
221. See id.
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Board should be given "ample room" to apply this phrase
appropriately for various types of workers.222
Health Care should be taken at face value: it is a very
narrow decision. Health Care rejects only the patient care
analysis. The independent judgment test is not a new test
invented by the Board to effect an "end run" around Health
Care. The independent judgment test has long been a part of
the Board's analysis. It is not at all clear that the Supreme
Court would reject this analysis.22
The Court in Health Care refused even to acknowledge
that the "in the interest of the employer" language was vague
or ambiguous. Consequently, the Court was able to avoid
according the Board the type of deference appropriate when
interpreting ambiguous statutory language, especially when
the language involves a technical subject that is squarely
within the agency's realm of expertise.224 The overlap between
the definitions of "supervisor" and "professional employee"
contained in the Act establishes sufficient ambiguity to make
deference appropriate in charge nurse cases.22 5 Moreover, the
Board has always applied a consistent three-part test in
analyzing supervisor cases involving health care professionals.
The Board has applied this test countless times under various
circumstances since 1974. In the face of such ambiguity and
given the existence of a test that has been applied consistently
by the Board, the Court's best option in Health Care would
have been to defer to the Board. As indicated by its response to
the Packard decision, Congress is willing to and capable of
reversing administrative positions it considers contrary to
legislative intent.
222. See id.
223. See id.
224. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467
U.S. 837 (1984). The Chevron doctrine has become the standard courts use to
examine administrative statutory interpretations. The test consists of a two
part inquiry. First, if it is determined that Congress has directly spoken to
the issue, the reviewing court must give effect to the will of Congress
irrespective of any contrary agency interpretation. See id. at 842-43. If,
however, the intent of Congress on a matter of statutory meaning is
ambiguous, the court is to proceed to ask whether the agency's interpretation
is a permissible construction of the statute. See id. at 843; see also Mid-
America Care Found. v. NLRB, 148 F.3d 638 (6th Cir. 1998) (discussing the
relationship between the Chevron doctrine and NLRB rulings).
225. See supra notes 51-66 and accompanying text.
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2. The Legislative History Supports the "Independent
Judgment" Analysis
The independent judgment test is further supported by the
legislative history of the NLRA.226 Despite the Court's
dismissal in Health Care of this history, Congress's intent in
creating the supervisor exemption is crucial in examining the
Board's latest approach. The Board's test is consistent with
Health Care's narrow holding and it successfully integrates the
intent of Congress and the purpose of the Act rather than
ignoring it as Health Care did.
As discussed above, Congress acted to clarify the purpose
of the Act after Packard by trying to draft statutory definitions
which accurately captured the relationships between
management and employees in order to balance the interest of
workers in unionizing against management's interest in
maintaining loyal representatives in the workplace. Congres-
sional history shows that it is the relationship, and not the
specific duties performed, that is crucial in this analysis. The
Supreme Court failed to notice this entirely while the NLRB
has struggled to craft policy to protect those relations.
Employer concern over misplaced or divided loyalty caused
by unionization of charge nurses should be eased upon a
deeper inspection of the patient care analysis. In accordance
with the express desire of Congress to exclude only those
workers possessing "such genuine management prerogatives as
the right to hire or fire, discipline, or make effective recom-
mendations with respect to such action,"2 27 the patient care
analysis required the Board to distinguish charge nurses
whose unionization would truly threaten the employer's
entitlement to loyal supervisors from those performing per-
functory professional duties. To fail to make this important
distinction would be to unfairly exclude a large proportion of
"professional employees" from the protections of the Act.22 8
226. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
227. Health Care, 511 U.S. at 589 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting S.
REP. NO. 80-105, at 3-4 (1947)).
228. See id. at 585-88 (noting that "most professionals supervise to some
extent" and suggesting that if the term "supervisor" is interpreted as broadly
as the majority interprets it, the inclusion of "professionals" would be
mooted).
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3. The History and Experience of the NLRB Should Be
Accorded Great Weight
The Board's vast experience in discerning and evaluating
the subtleties and complexities of the employer-employee
relationship make it deserving of more judicial deference than
the Supreme Court accorded it in Health Care.229 The NLRB
received 5,668 representation petitions in 1996 alone.2
30
Although the Board would not necessarily need to separate
supervisors from employees in relation to all of these petitions,
they certainly would with respect to many of them. Of these
petitions, 278 were specifically for "unit clarification to
determine whether certain classifications of employees should
be included in or excluded from existing bargaining units. 231
When the agency interpretation being reviewed by the court
involves a "technical and complex" subject, the agency's
decision should be accorded greater weight.232
The Board has been explicitly authorized to define
bargaining units appropriate for collective bargaining under
the NLRA233 and should be afforded adequate discretion to do
so. The Board, though lacking the legislative authority of
Congress, is uniquely qualified to resolve textual ambiguities
in the statute in a manner consistent with the various
purposes of the Act. The role of the courts in reviewing a
decision of the NLRB is limited to determining whether the
Board's conclusion is "supported by substantial evidence on the
record considered as a whole."234 In making this determi-
nation, the courts should be mindful of the Board's superior
knowledge of the facts and familiarity with the circumstances
in which labor disputes arise. The reasoning employed by the
courts advocating deference is perhaps best described in this
dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan:
229. For support of this view, see NLRB v. Yeshiva University, 444 U.S.
672, 692-93 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting). In noting the tension created by
the NLRA's "explicit inclusion, on the one hand, of 'professional employees'...
and its exclusion, on the other, of 'supervisors, Justice Brennan concludes
that "[pirimary authority to resolve these conflicts and to adapt the Act to the
changing patterns of industrial relations was entrusted to the Board, not to
the judiciary." Id.
230. See 61 NLRB ANN. REP. 10 (1996).
231. Id.
232. Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Central Lincoln Peoples' Util. Dist., 467 U.S.
380 (1984).
233. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1994).
234. Id. § 160(e).
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Through its cumulative experience in dealing with labor-management
relations in a variety of industrial and nonindustrial settings, it is the
Board that has developed the expertise to determine whether
coverage of a particular category of employees would further the
objectives of the Act. And through its continuous oversight of
industrial conditions, it is the Board that is best able to formulate
and adjust national labor policy to conform to the realities of
industrial life. Accordingly, the judicial role is limited; a court may
not substitute its own judgment for that of the Board. The Board's
decision may be reviewed for its rationality and its consistency with
the Act, but once these criteria are satisfied, the order must be
enforced.2'
4. The Board's Expertise Makes It Uniquely Qualified To
Make Difficult Decisions
Charge nurses represent a layer of authority between
front-line workers (the nurses' aides) and the true supervisors
in the nursing home hierarchy.236 Charge nurses undoubtedly
perform some of the supervisory duties enumerated in section
2(11), but the language of the Act makes it clear that not all
workers who perform these duties are to be excluded from the
protection of the Act. The duties must be performed "in the
interest of the employer" and must require the nurse to
exercise "independent judgment" in order for the performer to
be deemed a true supervisor. There is no question that
distinguishing "independent judgment" from other types of
judgment is exceedingly difficult. The language of the statute
provides no guidance in this task. If a charge nurse is
authorized to send an aide home when the aide is obviously
intoxicated, must the charge nurse exercise "independent
judgment" to determine if an aide is drunk?237 When a charge
nurse is instructed to call in aides to replace absent co-workers,
is the nurse exercising "independent judgment" in deciding
which aide to call? Or, instead, are these decisions merely
routine? When a charge nurse fills out an evaluation form for
aides in her unit, is she exercising independent judgment?
What if the nursing director never looks at the form in making
decisions about the promotion or retention of the aide? What if
the nursing director refers to the form, but does not rely on it
in performing an independent review of the aide?
235. Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 693-94 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted).
236. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 195-98 and accompanying text.
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The NLRB has dutifully answered these types of questions
since its creation in 1935. In answering such questions, the
Board takes into account the policy behind the Act, the intent
of the enacting and amending Congresses and, importantly,
the Board's vast experience in adapting the Act to the realities
of the modem workplace.
IV. IT IS NOT TOO LATE TO RESCUE CHARGE NURSES
FROM THE DEFICIENCIES OF HEALTH CARE
The Supreme Court did not consider the "independent
judgment" language in Health Care.238 On the contrary, the
Court explicitly and deliberately declined to interpret this
concededly ambiguous language.239 As a result, the problem of
determining the status of charge nurses under the NLRA was
not resolved by Health Care, but rather was aggravated by the
decision. The Board has taken its cue from Health Care and
reconfigured its charge nurse analysis in a way that is
consistent with the Supreme Court's textual interpretation of
the Act, while taking care to integrate the policy underlying
the Act in its interpretation of the ambiguous "independent
judgment" language.
The Supreme Court need not overrule Health Care in order
to reverse the damage done by the decision. The Court has left
itself ample room to approve the Board's current analysis. The
Supreme Court can and should provide some stronger
guidelines to the Board and the lower courts.
Another method of clarifying the issue would be for
Congress to revisit the NLRA and amend it to make clear its
intent with respect to minor supervisory employees such as
charge nurses. Congress may be content to wait for the
Supreme Court to issue a more definitive ruling on the issue
before taking up an amendment to the statute. As Congress
demonstrated with its quick and decisive reaction to the
Court's Packard decision, it is willing and able to take action if
it feels the Act's intent and purpose is not being adequately
served.
In the meantime, if nursing home operators truly believe
the divided loyalties of LPN charge nurses threaten the
integrity of their operations, they are free to alter the respon-
238. See supra notes 220-23 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 220-23 and accompanying text.
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sibilities of charge nurses and grant them real authority to act
as supervisors in the workplace. Employers may be reluctant
to make this change, however, because it would likely require
them to pay the charge nurses more than $11.00 per hour.
CONCLUSION
Despite the close vote on the case and the considerable
shortcomings of the majority opinion, the NLRB's "patient
care" analysis is dead after Health Care and will not likely be
revived. The Health Care decision, however, by its own
insistence, must be interpreted narrowly. The circuit split, and
the splits within individual circuits, that have emerged in the
wake of Health Care are clear evidence that reasonable minds
differ as to the proper interpretation of the "independent
judgment" language in section 2(11). All of this suggests that
the proper response to the Board's test is deference. The
Supreme Court should admonish the lower courts to defer to
the Board in supervisor cases absent any clear mistake of law
and thus shift the burden to the legislature to take action if it
feels the NLRB is acting in derogation of the Act.
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